upon two different grounds: either from such an hypothesis as this, that the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving itself, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that vAi/cij'ava'yici?, material and mechanical necessity, must needs reign over all things ; or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plotinus'[1] makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; SwrotJe *av T^ ^JLLCVO^ TOVTQVQ*

OVK av ol rov aXrjOovt; aTrorwyyravoi, oi jjzv yap a^> I*VOQ nvoq* ri ?ravra aWpralaw, *ol* §£ *OV'K* QWC^ A **mail, (saith** lie) **will**

no* do amiss, that will divide all Fat&lists %$t in-ta these two general heads, namely, that they Derive all things from one principle or not;-^the former of which may be called Divine Fatalists^ the latter Atheistical. Which Divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegemonic in everyone: and, secondly, such as make Fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very Fate, that is maintained by some neoteric Christians; the latter is the Fate of the Stoics.

Wherefore Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, maybe reduced to

[a] Libro de Fato, Eniiead. iii. lib. i. c. 2. p. 230.